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One Size Only Fits Some: Presuming Custody for the
Involuntarily Committed*
INTRODUCTION
The American legal system depends on broad legal standards
and tests to flexibly apply the law to many unique situations. Chief
Justice John Marshall espoused the judiciary’s role in creating such
tests to safeguard citizens from unconstitutional government action.1
In some situations, however, judicially created legal tests are
unnecessarily broad and have the potential to disadvantage classes of
individuals—even when those tests aim to protect constitutional
privileges such as the freedom from compelled self-incrimination.2
The Supreme Court of North Carolina found itself analyzing
such a test when it recently considered a case involving an individual’s
Miranda rights. A case of first impression in North Carolina,3 State v.
Hammonds4 considered the custody status of an involuntarily
committed individual for Miranda purposes.5 The Hammonds court
applied the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v.
Arizona,6 which evaluated the constitutionality of admitting into
evidence “statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way”7 when law enforcement failed to afford the defendant
“procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.”8 Regarding custody, the Miranda Court answered
with a legal standard that ultimately developed into a purportedly
* © 2019 David B. Wall.
1. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 622, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372 (2015) (Inman,
J., dissenting) (“The issue of whether and in what circumstances police questioning of an
involuntarily committed person is custodial is one of first impression in North Carolina.”),
rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).
4. 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).
5. Id. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 439–40.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. Id. at 445.
8. Id. at 444.
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“one-size-fits-all” test.9 To receive the protections offered by
Miranda, an individual must be in custody—a status that a court
determines by considering the “totality of the circumstances”10 as to
whether “there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest.”11
Considering the custody status of involuntarily committed
persons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina flatly rejected a
custody per se designation in favor of discerning custody on a case-bycase basis.12 Under a custody per se designation, an individual is
presumptively in custody when a certain condition is met,13 unless the
prosecution can rebut this presumption by showing that an exception
applies.14 The court’s rejection of this approach in Hammonds is
problematic because of the resulting coercive pressures that
involuntarily committed individuals experience when their liberty is
restricted regardless of whether they committed a crime. Because the
Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to adequately weigh these
coercive pressures, it erred in applying the one-size-fits-all approach
to the involuntarily committed.
This Recent Development addresses the complications of the
totality-of-the-circumstances custody approach for the involuntarily
committed and argues that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
should have adopted a custody per se rule. In its current form, the
totality-of-the-circumstances test will encroach on the constitutional
privilege to be free from compelled self-incrimination for defendants
who are involuntarily committed because these individuals experience
preemptive and significant restrictions on liberty and are subjected to
coercion by law enforcement as a result. The one-size-fits-all
approach, in practice, does not fit all.

9. Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1529 (2008).
10. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 162, 804 S.E.2d at 442 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 533
N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)).
11. Id. (quoting Buchanan, 533 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828).
12. Id. at 165–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44.
13. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 504–05 (2012) (reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s
holding that “isolation from the general prison population combined with questioning
about conduct occurring outside the prison makes any such interrogation custodial per
se”); Luis Then, Note, Applying the ‘Cuffs: Consistency and Clarity in a Bright-Line Rule
for Arrest-Like Restraints Under Miranda Custody, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 843, 863 (2016)
(“[A]ny individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as being placed in handcuffs or
into the back of a police car, or having weapons drawn on him—is in custody for purposes
of Miranda.”).
14. See Then, supra note 13, at 863.
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Part I of the analysis introduces Miranda, its progeny, and the
facts and ruling of Hammonds. Part II discusses why the involuntarily
committed require a different custody standard that provides
additional protection. Part III explains the flaw in rejecting custody
per se for the involuntarily committed and proposes a bright-line
solution while showing that the new rule will not greatly disrupt the
protections offered by Miranda and its progeny.
I. BACKDROP: FROM MIRANDA TO HAMMONDS
Over four decades have passed since the Supreme Court decided
Miranda.15 Since then, the decision has facilitated a national
discussion about balancing appropriate protections for the accused
and the ability of law enforcement to thwart and solve crime. The
doctrine, now cemented in American criminal procedure, is arguably
one of the most widely recognized legal protections. Nonetheless,
there have been developments and alterations to Miranda since its
inception in 1966. A lesser-known aspect of Miranda—the fact that
someone must be in custody to receive its protections—is the focus of
this Recent Development.16 This part will first discuss the specific
aspects of Miranda protection and the test for the requisite finding of
custody. Second, it will discuss the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s custody analysis in Hammonds and its rejection of a
custody per se designation for the involuntarily committed.
A. The Miranda Framework and Developments
Miranda established a basic procedural framework for law
enforcement when interrogating individuals suspected of crime.17 The
majority in Miranda sought to “protect persons in all settings in which
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves.”18 To this end, the Miranda
Court created a standard that required “procedural safeguards”19 for
those who have been “taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. See generally Then, supra note 13 (describing the complex analysis needed to
determine whether a custodial interrogation occurred).
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
18. Id. at 467.
19. Id. at 478–79 (stating that an individual in custody “must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires”).
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freedom by the authorities in any significant way . . . .”20 Although the
safeguards themselves were laid out in a checklist fashion, the
standard to decide who exactly is “deprive[d]” lacks uniformity
among the states.21 The clear-cut custody determination in Miranda
left lower courts to grapple with custody determinations in
innumerable other, more nuanced scenarios.
Ultimately, courts have settled on a totality-of-the-circumstances
test that assesses the degree to which a defendant’s situation mirrors
the station house at issue in Miranda22 to determine whether an
individual is in custody. The test considers (1) the circumstances
surrounding interrogation and (2) within those circumstances,
whether a reasonable person “[would] have felt he or she was [not] at
liberty to terminate the [interrogation] and leave.”23 Courts must
objectively determine whether there was either a formal arrest or
“restraint on freedom of movement” closely enough associated with
formal arrest.24 Although the Miranda standard for custody is
considered a rigid one by its supporters and critics alike,25 its
applicability to specific categories of defendants has nonetheless been
challenged numerous times.26

20. Id. at 478.
21. See Then, supra note 13, at 858–59 (discussing the two different approaches state
courts have taken when determining custody). Further, the Miranda Court did not have to
handle this deprivation of freedom issue because the defendants were arrested, taken to a
station house, and questioned in an interrogation room, thus leaving little room to argue
that the defendants were not in police custody. See id. at 846 (citing Leslie A. Lunney, The
Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 753–54, 768
(1999)).
22. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
23. State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 162, 804 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2017) (quoting J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011)).
24. Id. (quoting State v. Buchanan, 533 N.C. 332, 339, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)).
25. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 282 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(supporting the maintenance of the “rigidity” of Miranda); S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 46
(1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2132 (criticizing the “rigid and inflexible
requirements” of the majority opinion in . . . Miranda); see also Ellen A. Peters, State
Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 592
(1986) (“For better or worse, the prophylactic rules of Miranda are today firmly
embedded in the legal landscape of the law of self-incrimination.” (footnote omitted));
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 975 (1995) (using Miranda
as an example that legal rules advantageously “embolden” and “constrain”
decisionmakers, thereby promoting predictability of legal decisions and enhancing
visibility and accountability for those enforcing or interpreting the rule).
26. See, e.g., Fields, 565 U.S. at 508 (considering whether prisoners are automatically
in custody for purposes of Miranda); J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264 (discussing whether a child’s
age is “relevant” to the custody analysis of Miranda).
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Hammonds and Custody Analysis

Hammonds illustrates courts’ reluctance to replace the totalityof-the-circumstances test with a presumption of custody.27 The
defendant, Tae Kwon Hammonds, was involuntarily committed to a
local hospital after an intentional overdose.28 A magistrate ordered
Hammonds’s commitment on the basis that he was “mentally ill and
dangerous to self or others.”29 Meanwhile, law enforcement suspected
Hammonds of committing armed robbery the night before his
commitment based on video surveillance used to identify him.30 The
day after the magistrate ordered Hammonds’s commitment, officers
visited Hammonds to question him while he was involuntarily
committed in the hospital.31 During questioning, Hammonds made
statements to the police which formed the basis of a criminal charge—
robbery with a dangerous weapon—begging the question of whether
he was in custody at the time of the questioning.32
The officers, wearing plain clothes, questioned Hammonds for
nearly an hour and a half and “never informed the defendant he
could tell them to leave”33 or that he could end the questioning.34
Though Hammonds had been committed to a hospital after an
intentional overdose, he was not under the influence of drugs during
the interrogation, and his nurse allowed the detectives into his room.35
Despite Hammonds being “repeatedly told he was not under
arrest,”36 nor handcuffed,37 he was under continuous supervision by a

27. See Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 164–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44; see also Fields, 565 U.S.
at 508 (declining to find a custody per se designation when an incarcerated individual is
questioned in an isolated setting about a crime committed outside the prison that was
separate from the crime for which he was incarcerated). The Fields Court clarified that a
previous opinion, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), “did not hold that
imprisonment alone is sufficient to constitute Miranda custody.” Fields, 565 U.S. at 507;
see also State v. Fisher, 158 N.C. App. 133, 145, 580 S.E.2d 405, 415 (2003) (“An inmate,
however, is not, because of his incarceration, automatically in custody for the purposes of
Miranda.” (quoting State v. Briggs, 137 N.C. App. 125, 129, 526 S.E.2d 678, 680 (2000))),
aff’d per curiam, 358 N.C. 215, 593 S.E.2d 583 (2004).
28. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 440.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 164, 804 S.E.2d at 442–43.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 164, 804 S.E.2d at 443.
37. Id.
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hospital staff member who sat outside Hammonds’s room and
accompanied him to the restroom.38
Although these facts were not enough for the trial court to find a
Miranda violation, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ultimately
decided in Hammonds’s favor.39 Despite rejecting a custody per se
designation,40 the court found that Hammonds was subjected to a
custodial interrogation and thus was entitled to hear his Miranda
rights prior to the interrogation for two reasons. First, Hammonds
was “severely restricted” in his freedom of movement by the
commitment order since he could not leave or move independently
throughout the hospital.41 Second, Hammonds was in custody because
the detectives not only failed to inform him that he was free to
terminate questioning but also because they told him they would
leave only after he answered their questions.42 Thus, the court found,
Hammonds was in custody.43
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, despite ruling in favor of
Hammonds, missed an opportunity to better secure the Fifth
Amendment privilege for those who are involuntarily committed with
a custody per se designation.44 As will be discussed below, because
involuntary commitments implicate procedures and practices that
infringe on an individual’s liberty prior to criminal conviction, a
constitutional protection in the form of a custody per se designation is
necessary to protect those who are committed and subsequently
questioned by authorities. Essentially, Hammonds gave law
enforcement a guide on questioning tactics that will pass muster
before a court, but failed to protect interviewees from the inherent
coercive pressures of involuntary commitment going forward. Even
38. Id.
39. Id. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444.
40. Id.at 167, 804 S.E.2d at 444.
41. Id. at 163–64, 804 S.E.2d at 443–44 (explaining that Hammonds’s “freedom of
movement was already severely restricted,” despite not being handcuffed or otherwise
restrained, because a hospital staff member supervised Hammonds at all times and
accompanied him to the bathroom). However, courts have been reluctant to hold that
restricted movement is a “sufficient” condition for custody. See id.; see also Howes v.
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) (“We have ‘declined to accord talismanic power’ to the
freedom-of-movement inquiry and have instead asked the additional question whether the
relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984))).
42. Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444.
43. Id. at 166–67, 804 S.E.2d at 444.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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though Hammonds secured a favorable verdict, other involuntarily
committed defendants will not be similarly protected absent a
presumption of custody.
II. THE INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED REQUIRE A DIFFERENT
STANDARD
Understanding why the reasoning in Hammonds was flawed
requires familiarity with involuntary commitment processes and their
related issues. Scholarship and jurisprudence on involuntary
commitment show that the practice implicates pressing social and
legal issues—namely, adequate care for people with psychiatric and
substance abuse disorders, societal safety, and due process concerns
for those who are subject to the constraints of commitment.45 In
addition, those who are mentally ill or addicted to drugs—a large
population of society—carry substantial risk of being subjected to
involuntary commitment.46 The balance of societal safety weighed
against the liberty and health interests of the involuntarily committed
currently tips heavily in favor of society: the civilly committed are not
confined because of a crime they have committed but out of fear of a
crime they may commit. Further, as will be discussed, there is no
constitutional right for involuntarily committed individuals to receive
45. See, e.g., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., TREAT OR REPEAT: A STATE
OF SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS, MAJOR CRIMES, AND COMMUNITY TREATMENT

SURVEY
1 (2017),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treat-or-repeat.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BQ85-MNSN] (discussing “each state’s structure and programming” surrounding the care
for mentally ill individuals who have committed major crimes and advocating for more
treatment and less jail time for these individuals); see also Austin Baumgarten, Medical
Treatment Demands Medical Assessment: Substantive Due Process Rights in Involuntary
Commitments, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 603 (2011) (advocating for “medically based
evaluations before emergency involuntary commitments” to better protect substantive due
process rights for the involuntarily committed).
46. Bose et al., Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United States:
Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA (Sept. 2018),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017/NSDUHFFR2017.
htm [https://perma.cc/G66G-E5B9] (reporting that “46.6 million adults aged 18 or older (18.9
percent) had any mental illness . . . in the past year” as of 2017 and that 11.2 million adults
had a serious mental illness). The report also noted that as of 2017, “approximately 19.7
million people aged 12 or older had a substance abuse disorder.” Id. As will be discussed,
the requirements for involuntary commitment often include a showing of mental illness or
substance abuse and a finding that the individual is a danger to themselves or others. See,
e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-262(a) (2017). For a summary of each state’s involuntary
commitment statutes, see generally TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., EMERGENCY
HOSPITALIZATION FOR EVALUATION (2011), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
storage/documents/Emergency_Hospitalization_for_Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/76ERYGZN].
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treatment for their conditions while confined.47 Therefore, it is critical
to consider the history and procedures of civil commitment,
population-wide mental health and substance abuse data, and
alterations to the Miranda custody standard to understand why the
current one-size-fits-all test is not adequate to ensure the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination for this
group. In brief, equalizing the competing public and private interests
requires more robust protection for the involuntarily committed.
A. The Involuntary Commitment Process
State standards for involuntary commitment show why the
involuntarily committed merit a presumption of custody. Under
North Carolina law, an individuals must undergo a four-step process
before being committed.48 First, a petition must be submitted to a
magistrate indicating that the individual is mentally ill and either a
danger to themselves or others, or “in need of treatment in order to
prevent further disability or deterioration that would predictably
result in dangerousness.”49 Second, if a magistrate finds grounds for
involuntary commitment, the individual is taken into custody for an
initial examination.50 The individual is held at a twenty-four-hour
facility until the second examination occurs.51 If no such facility is
available, the individual can be held in custody up to seven days,
which is renewable upon subsequent allegations.52 Third, if
commitment is recommended by the first evaluator, a second
47. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1975) (declining to confirm the
lower court’s decision that a “person confined against his will at a state mental institution
has a ‘constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give him a
reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition’” (quoting
Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563 (1975))).
48. BENJAMIN M. TURNAGE, JOHN RUBIN & DOROTHY T. WHITESIDE, NORTH
CAROLINA CIVIL COMMITMENT MANUAL 14–15 (John Rubin ed., 2d ed. 2011). Because
Hammonds was admitted for mental illness, Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at
440, the process discussed above is specific to mental illness, though the process for
substance abuse commitment is generally the same or similar, TURNAGE ET AL., supra, at
72.
49. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 18.
50. See id. at 14.
51. See id. at 26.
52. See id. at 25–26 (adding that the most problematic aspect of the process at this
stage is that, as was the case in Hammonds, an individual does not have to be present at
the initial custody hearing if they are transported to the hospital in an emergency
situation, such as an intentional overdose). Although Hammonds was admitted for an
intentional overdose, he was designated as mentally ill rather than a substance abuser.
Hammonds, 370 N.C. at 159, 804 S.E.2d at 440.
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examination must be performed within twenty-four hours of the
individual’s arrival at the facility.53 Notably, a respondent could be
taken into custody, recommended by the first evaluator for
commitment, and held for up to seven days if no twenty-four-hour
facility is available, all before the second evaluation is conducted.54
Court-ordered inpatient treatment can be instituted for up to ninety
days, must be administered at a twenty-four-hour facility,55 and can be
renewed for an additional 180 days.56 Rehearings after the second
commitment can extend the individual’s commitment for up to a year
and can be renewed indefinitely.57
In practice, involuntary commitment burdens the committed
individual’s liberty interests, and commitment procedures could
better protect the rights of the involuntarily committed. For example,
people taken into custody and evaluated for involuntary commitment
are entitled to counsel during the proceedings.58 According to the
North Carolina Civil Commitment Manual, counsel is provided due to
the “significant infringement on a respondent’s liberty interest”59 and
the restriction on the individual’s “freedom of movement.”60
Nonetheless, as discussed below, the right is not guaranteed from the
outset of the proceedings. Entitlement to counsel, the principal means
of legal protection for the involuntarily committed, should therefore
be more safely guarded because of the liberty interests at stake.
Although the involuntarily committed do receive counsel during
hearings if they cannot obtain their own, they are not entitled to
representation until after admittance to a twenty-four-hour facility—a
period of custody that can last up to seven days.61 Generally, those
subject to commitment are appointed counsel after their second
evaluation, long after they have already been detained.62 As a result,
the appointment of counsel may be delayed when there is not a
twenty-four-hour facility that can house the individual.63 Even more
alarming is that these seven-day detentions can be renewed
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 26.
Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 50–51.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-276(e) (Supp. 2018).
Id. § 122C-276(f).
See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 13.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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indefinitely as an evaluator can “begin the commitment process with
a new petition and affidavit and new allegations.”64 Thus involuntarily
committed individuals may be held for long periods without access to
counsel. Should police arrive to ask questions during this period, they
are at a disadvantage without an attorney and are particularly
susceptible to coercion by police. Without even basic legal protection
during this seven-day period, a custody per se designation is the most
administrable and effective way to protect the rights of the
involuntarily committed.
B.

Origins of the Modern Involuntary Commitment Process

United States Supreme Court jurisprudence provides the basis
for state standards on involuntary commitment. Prior to 1975, state
standards regarding involuntary commitment ranged from requiring a
showing of mental illness and “dangerousness” to proving that a
nondangerous individual was mentally ill and a pauper.65 In 1975, the
Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson66 solidified the
former as the baseline standard that a state must show to subject an
individual to the involuntary commitment process.67 Although the
Court declined to determine whether a patient ordered to the care of
a state hospital has a constitutional right to treatment, it ruled in the
patient’s favor, explaining that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ alone
cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.”68 The
Court briefly addressed public policy concerns by explaining that
stigma against the mentally ill does not justify the deprivation of

64. Id.
65. Dan Moon, The Dangerousness of the Status Quo: A Case for Modernizing Civil
Commitment Law, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 209, 212 (2014). For further discussion of the
history of involuntary commitment, see id. at 211–15.
66. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
67. Id. at 576; see also Moon, supra note 65, at 212 (“The modern history of
involuntary commitment began with . . . O’Connor v. Donaldson in 1975 . . . holding that in
order to constitutionally commit and confine an individual, the state must show that the
person is dangerous to himself or others and that they are not capable of living safely
under the supervision of family or friends.” (footnotes omitted)).
68. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. Donaldson sued the superintendent of a Florida state
hospital alleging “intentional[] and malicious[]” deprivation of his “constitutional right to
liberty” when he was held as a mentally ill patient in a state hospital for fifteen years solely
for being mentally ill. Id. at 565. Donaldson asserted that he could not be involuntarily
committed because “he was dangerous to no one, that he was not mentally ill, and that, at
any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his supposed illness.” Id.
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liberty that the involuntarily committed experience.69 The Court
ultimately held that “a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in
freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family
members or friends.”70 Finding no evidence that Donaldson was a
danger to himself or anyone, the Court ruled in his favor.71
The “dangerousness” standard created by the Court in
Donaldson still guides state law on involuntary commitment.72 The
Donaldson decision and subsequent state legislative action show that
civil commitment implicates weighty societal interests ranging from
due process and welfare concerns to societal safety. By raising the
standard for many states, the Court improved the due process based
protections of mentally ill individuals by ensuring that they could only
be taken into custody if they are a danger to themselves or society.
The Court, however, also showed that the primary purpose for
involuntary commitment is the safety of the public, not the treatment
of committed individuals, since it allows for the confinement of an
individual despite not being convicted of a crime and does not
guarantee a right to treatment. For these reasons, appropriate legal
precautions, such as a per se custody designation, should be
implemented to adequately protect the rights of the civilly committed,
equalizing the interests of public safety and personal liberty. The legal
procedures for involuntary commitment show just how significantly
an individual’s right to liberty is infringed during the commitment
process, and why the scale of public and private benefit currently
weighs against the private interest of personal liberty.
The facts of Hammonds provide an apt example. North
Carolina’s emergency involuntary commitment statute, which was
69. Id. at 576.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 573.
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-91(a) (Westlaw through Act 2018-579) (requiring an
individual to be mentally ill and pose an immediate danger to themselves or others); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150(a) (West Supp. 2019) (requiring that a person suffering from
a mental disorder be “a danger to others, or to himself or herself”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 5003(c)(2) (2017) (requiring that “the psychiatrist believes the individual presents a
danger to self or danger to others”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 573.001(a)
(Westlaw through 2017 Reg. and 1st Sess. of the 85th Leg.) (requiring a showing of
“mental illness” and “a substantial risk of serious harm to the person or to others unless
the person is immediately restrained”). For a compilation of each state’s emergency
involuntary commitment statutes, see generally TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., supra
note 46; and Baumgarten, supra note 45, at 602 (discussing how states had to adhere to the
“‘dangerousness’ model” following the Donaldson decision).
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applied to Hammonds, provides that anyone “who is mentally ill and
either (i) dangerous to self . . . or others . . . or (ii) in need of
treatment in order to prevent further disability or deterioration that
would predictably result in dangerousness” may be taken into custody
and evaluated for involuntary commitment.73 Once these
requirements are met and the individual is taken into custody,
involuntary commitment procedures are triggered and the State must
find “by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the respondent is
mentally ill and dangerous to self . . . or dangerous to others” in order
to continue confining the individual.74 The magistrate ordered
Hammonds’s commitment on the basis that he was a danger to
himself and mentally ill when he intentionally overdosed, subjecting
him to the processes described above.
Hammonds’s case provides practical insight into how swiftly the
state is willing to act in instances when a potentially mentally ill
individual may be dangerous to himself or others and, thus, subject to
state control. While public safety is a valid justification for
involuntary commitment, more can be done to protect the individual
liberty side of the scale to achieve equilibrium without disrupting
current procedures that protect the public. Moreover, there is a
judicial avenue by which a court can achieve this equilibrium by using
a custody per se designation.
C.

Miranda Custody Has Changed

The custody analysis in Hammonds shows that there is room to
create a new standard for certain groups.75 Thus, the “rigid” nature of
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (2017). The criteria for dangerousness to self
includes an inability, “without care, supervision, and the continued assistance of others not
otherwise available, to exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his
daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy his need for nourishment, personal
or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety” as well as “a reasonable probability
of his suffering serious physical debilitation within the near future unless adequate
treatment is given pursuant to this Chapter.” Id. § 122C-3(11)(a). Dangerous to others
means that within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to
inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such
a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has
engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable
probability that this conduct will be repeated.
Id. § 122C-3(11)(b).
74. Id. § 122C-268(j).
75. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011) (altering the totality-ofthe-circumstances test for minor defendants).
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Miranda is not necessarily immutable.76 In Hammonds, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina relied on precedent that previously altered
the “analysis in cases where a minor is the defendant.”77 In J.D.B. v.
North Carolina,78 the Supreme Court of the United States considered
a child’s age when analyzing “the relevant circumstances of the
interrogation.”79 Although the Court in J.D.B. did not consider a
custody per se designation, its decision deviated from the one-sizefits-all approach, partly because children are “most susceptible to
influence”80 and because a “determination of . . . youth” does not
involve considering the subjective “‘mindset’ of any particular
child.”81
The J.D.B. decision is significant for two reasons. First, it shows
that the Court is willing to alter the test to determine custody in
general—Miranda is not a hard-and-fast rule equally applied to all
groups. Second, the Court is willing to adapt the test when a
vulnerable class of people, susceptible to influence, is at risk of police
coercion. Given the run in the fabric of the totality-of-thecircumstances test caused by J.D.B., the Supreme Court of North
Carolina could have pulled the thread to create a new standard for
involuntarily committed individuals without drastically departing
from precedent.
Individuals committed for mental illness, while categorically
different from children in many respects, experience many of the
same legal restrictions as children due to a similar susceptibility to
influence.82 Therefore, the basis for changing the custody standard for
children can be applied to this different but similarly restricted group.
Many legal disqualifications applied to children are similarly applied
to people with mental illness. Generally, individuals under the age of
eighteen are “subject to the supervision and control” of their

76. Id. at 282 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Miranda court set down rigid standards
that often require courts to ignore personal characteristics that may be highly relevant to a
particular suspect’s actual susceptibility to police pressure.”).
77. Id. at 281 (majority opinion) (holding that courts must consider “all of the
relevant circumstances of the interrogation,” including the age of the defendant when he
or she is a minor).
78. 564 U.S. 261 (2011).
79. Id. at 281.
80. Id. at 275 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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parents.83 Similarly, for the involuntarily committed, individuals are
admitted and held at a twenty-four-hour facility while they await their
second medical evaluation and judicial review and are committed if
found to be mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.84 As a
result, an involuntarily committed individual, particularly one who is
indigent, is subject to the supervision and control of the state when
they are taken into custody and admitted to a twenty-four-hour
facility. Additionally, both the mentally ill and children are limited in
their ability to contract, suggesting the inability of either to fully grasp
the gravity of certain legal decisions.85
Moreover, involuntarily committed individuals are subject to the
will of guardians who have powers of attorney.86 Where a child’s
parent may be able to advocate on their behalf in a custodial
interrogation,87 an involuntarily committed person must rely on a
nurse or other healthcare professional to act in their best interests.88
Where a child may not be mature enough to make certain decisions
on her own, the involuntarily committed have certain legal
disqualifications imposed upon them because of their inability to care
for themselves as evidenced by the commitment order.89
Because of the aforementioned legal disqualifications, the
involuntarily committed are “susceptible to influence” not unlike
children. Since someone is legally impaired as long as they are
involuntarily committed, they are similarly “susceptible to influence”
by law enforcement officials because they may fear reprisal due to
psychiatric conditions.90 Since “the modern practice of custodial
interrogation could be psychologically coercive, rather than just
physical,” additional protections should be made for individuals who

83. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-3400 (2017). Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the
general rule. See id. § 7B-3402 (listing exceptions to parental supervision and control if an
individual under the age of eighteen is married, in the armed forces, or emancipated).
84. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
86. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2 (stating that a “legally responsible person”
can be defined as a “guardian” in the case of “an adult, who has been adjudicated
incompetent”).
87. See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273 n.6.
88. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
89. See id. at 3.
90. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 512 (2012); State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App.
602, 611–12, 777 S.E.2d 359, 366 (2015), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017);
TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 3.
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have psychological ailments or issues beyond modifying the totalityof-the-circumstances test.91
So why not make mental illness a “relevant circumstance” of the
interrogation and apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to the
mentally ill as was done in J.D.B.?92 This solution would not work for
the mentally ill because it would require law enforcement to look into
the subjective mindset of individuals.93 A finding that someone is a
minor, on the other hand, involves drawing on an experience that
everyone has had and what “any parent knows.”94 Being a minor is a
relatable aspect of being human—there is a universal understanding
that children cannot comprehend the consequences of some actions.95
Mental illness is a far more amorphous concept, as evidenced by
extensive cataloguing of different disorders.96 Childhood, by contrast,
is a measurable and finite condition. By law, an individual typically
reaches the age of majority at eighteen.97 Alternatively, from a legal
perspective, mental illness can be indefinite, as evidenced by civil
commitment procedures. Therefore, since a protection must be
offered for involuntarily committed individuals because of their
susceptibility to influence, and since applying the totality-of-thecircumstances cannot be done without entering the subjective mindset
of the mentally ill, a legal protection should take the form of a brightline presumption.

91. Then, supra note 13, at 846.
92. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 281.
93. Mental illness may be grouped into two categories: any mental illness and serious
mental illness. Bose et al., supra note 46. People with any mental illness are “defined as
having any mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder in the past year that met DSM-IV
criteria,” while people with serious mental illness experience “any mental, behavioral, or
emotional disorder that substantially interfere[s] with or limited one or more major life
activities.” Id. The DSM-V now lists over 250 mental disorders. See generally AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].
94. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 273.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., DSM-V, supra note 93, at xiii–xxxiv.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48A-2 (2017) (“A minor is any person who has not reached the
age of 18 years.”). But see id. § 7B-3402 (“This Article shall not apply to any juvenile
under the age of 18 who is married or who is serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, or who has been emancipated.”).
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III. THE FLAW IN REJECTING CUSTODY PER SE AND THE BRIGHTLINE PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court of North Carolina erred in applying the
reasoning from another custody per se case and in concluding that
involuntary commitment does not warrant a custody per se standard.
This part will first discuss the United States Supreme Court’s reason
for denying custody per se for prisoners and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina’s use of that decision to reject the same approach for
the involuntarily committed. Next, it will show how the Supreme
Court of North Carolina failed to adequately consider the Supreme
Court’s reasoning when applying the principles to the involuntarily
committed. Finally, it explains how a bright-line custody rule for the
involuntarily committed would function without implicating the
concerns that many may have for bestowing a custody per se
determination.
A. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of Custody Per Se for Prisoners
The Supreme Court has confronted the validity of custody per se
designations in a context other than involuntary commitment.98 In
Howes v. Fields,99 the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant
was in custody per se when he was removed from the general prison
population and questioned; it determined he was not.100 In Fields, two
armed sheriff’s deputies questioned Fields while he was incarcerated
for a crime that occurred prior to his imprisonment.101 The deputies
escorted Fields to a separate interrogation room outside of the
general population of the prison. There, the officers questioned him
about allegations of sexual misconduct against a minor.102 At the
beginning of the five-hour interview, the officers informed Fields that
he could leave and return to his cell at any time and did not place him
in handcuffs.103 The officers reminded Fields that he was free to leave
and return to his cell even after he became agitated when confronted
with the allegations.104 Ultimately, Fields confessed to the allegations
98. E.g., Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 504 (2012) (stating that the Sixth Circuit ruled
a prisoner was in custody per se when he was “isolate[ed] from the general prison
population combined with questioning about conduct occurring outside the prison”).
99. 565 U.S. 499 (2012).
100. Id. at 504, 508.
101. Id. at 502–03.
102. Id. at 502.
103. Id. at 503.
104. Id.
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of sexual misconduct, but challenged the admissibility of his
confession because he was not read his Miranda rights during
questioning.105 He argued that he was in custody because, during the
course of the interview, he no longer wished to speak with the
deputies.106 Nonetheless, he did not return to his cell or request to do
so.107
On these facts, the Court, balancing the totality of the
circumstances, found law enforcement did not subject Fields to a
custodial interrogation.108 The Court noted that Fields’s ability to
return to his cell and the lack of physical restraint outweighed the
facts that the deputies were armed, the interview extended well after
Fields’s bedtime and that Fields was incarcerated.109
The Court found Fields was not in custody under the totality-ofthe-circumstances test after first dispensing with the custody per se
designation adopted by the Sixth Circuit.110 The Court rejected
wholesale the Sixth Circuit’s custody per se finding for three reasons:
(1) authorities questioning a prisoner do not induce “the shock that
very often accompanies arrest,” (2) an incarcerated person knows
that they are in prison for a fixed amount of time and “is unlikely to
be lured into speaking” to be released sooner, and (3) prisoners know
that law enforcement probably has no control to lengthen or shorten
their prison terms.111 Justice Alito concluded his discussion of the
rejection of custody per se by stating that “a term of imprisonment,
without more,” falls outside of the ambit of Miranda custody.112
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rejected a
custody per se designation for the involuntarily committed by making
an analogy to the Fields decision.113 The Supreme Court of North
Carolina adhered to the United States Supreme Court rule that
“imprisonment alone is not enough to create a custodial situation
105. Id. at 504.
106. Id. at 503–04.
107. Id. at 504.
108. Id. at 514–15.
109. Id. at 514–15.
110. Id. at 508–09 (explaining that the custody determination is not categorically rule
based but rather a consideration of whether, “in light of ‘the objective circumstances of
the interrogation,’ a ‘reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave’” (citations omitted) (first quoting Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam); then quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112 (1995))).
111. Id. at 511–12.
112. Id. at 512.
113. See State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 163, 804 S.E.2d 440, 443 (2017).
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within the meaning of Miranda,”114 but failed to consider the
reasoning behind the rejection of a custody per se designation in this
new situation.115 In brief, the Supreme Court of North Carolina erred
in likening imprisonment to involuntary commitment.
B.

Involuntary Commitment and Imprisonment Are Not Analogous
for Purposes of Miranda Custody Analysis

The Supreme Court of North Carolina erroneously analogized to
the prisoners in Fields when considering whether Miranda protections
should automatically apply to the involuntarily committed. In its
analysis in Hammonds, the Supreme Court of North Carolina drew
on a commonality between prisoners and those involuntarily
committed—the limitation on the “freedom of movement” by
circumstances not connected to the interrogation—to dispense with
the custody per se discussion.116 However, the lack of consideration of
the reasoning in Fields leaves open the inquiry into whether
involuntarily committed individuals really should be treated the same
as prisoners. With this inquiry left open, this section demonstrates
that the same assumptions made by the Fields Court for incarcerated
persons do not apply to the involuntarily committed for purposes of
determining custody.
1. Involuntarily Committed Individuals May Be Lured into Speaking
and May Not Know Who Determines Custody
One who is involuntarily committed could be “lured into
speaking by a longing for prompt release.”117 Unlike prisoners,
individuals committed for mental illness in North Carolina are
confined for generally shorter periods of time that are renewable at
the end of each period.118 An individual’s commitment status depends
on subsequent physician evaluation and a judicial order releasing or
extending commitment.119 But nothing in the process, at least under
North Carolina law, is designed to ensure that an individual
understands this process until the individual receives counsel at the
114. See id. at 165, 804 S.E.2d at 443 (quoting Fields, 565 U.S. at 511).
115. See id. at 165–66, 804 S.E.2d at 443 (analyzing the factors considered by the Sixth
Circuit and its conclusion, but failing to address why those factors were considered).
116. See id. at 166, 804 S.E.2d at 444.
117. Fields, 565 U.S. at 511.
118. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 57 (stating that increasing periods of
confinement may culminate in “commitment . . . for a total of 365 days”).
119. Id. at 3.
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second evaluation stage.120 Therefore, an involuntarily committed
individual could cooperate with authorities believing that doing so
will prove he is no longer impaired and is ready to be released or
treated on an outpatient basis.121
Granted, opponents of a custody per se designation could argue
that if an individual believed that the medical staff, and not the
authorities, had the power to release them, this could weigh against
finding that the person was in custody under the totality-of-the
circumstances. While it is possible that an involuntarily committed
individual could believe this to be true at the outset, efforts to
convince medical staff will prove fruitless because, ultimately, a judge
decides whether or not a committed person should be released.122
Since a committed individual’s initial attempts to try to convince
medical staff to release him will be ineffective, he would probably be
lured into speaking to other people he comes in contact with,
including law enforcement.
Finally, an involuntarily committed individual may not
understand the legal process behind their commitment, having not
been read their rights nor given the benefits of counsel prior to
confinement in the way that criminal defendants are, and additionally
are unable to care for themselves as a matter of law.123 An
involuntarily committed individual is less likely to know who has the
authority to shorten or lengthen their sentence and, therefore, is not
similarly situated to incarcerated individuals.124 This is because, as
stated above, the right to counsel exists for the involuntarily
committed only after the individual is taken into custody, and they
typically do not receive counsel until their second evaluation—after
potentially having been in custody for seven days.125 Therefore, the
involuntarily committed are not similarly situated as prisoners to the
extent that they could be lured into speaking to anyone, including law
120. Id. at 13–14 (stating that a person who is being involuntarily committed “has the
right to counsel through all stages of the proceedings” but in most cases “counsel is [not]
appointed [until] after the [person’s] second evaluation”).
121. See id. at 15 (recognizing that outpatient commitment “involves less restriction of
freedom and fewer collateral consequences than an inpatient commitment”).
122. See id. at 3 (explaining that “regardless of the physician’s or eligible psychologist’s
request,” the court is free to determine which type of commitment is to be ordered).
123. See State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 623, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372–73 (2015)
(Inman, J., dissenting), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).
124. See TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 13–14 (noting respondent’s right to
counsel while acknowledging that appointment of counsel is often delayed for as many as
seven days after the respondent’s initial detention).
125. See supra text accompanying note 120.
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enforcement, and they do not have reason to know who makes the
decision as to their commitment status.
2. An Involuntarily Committed Individual Would Experience “the
Shock that Very Often Accompanies Arrest” When Questioned by
Authorities
The Fields Court expounded on the “shock” concept by
explaining that it involves “a sharp and ominous change” that results
in a person being “cut off from his normal life and companions.”126
Further, the Court stated that the “expected and familiar” aspects of
imprisonment “do not involve the same ‘inherently coercive
pressures’” that a person who is questioned by authorities outside of
prison may experience in the same setting. The civil commitment
process, on the other hand, represents a sharp and ominous change
because it cuts people off from their normal life and companions, and
involves the same inherently coercive pressures present at the station
house in Miranda. Involuntarily committed individuals are taken to
an emergency room against their will and held with less judicial
process than prisoners. As a result, civilly committed individuals
would experience the shock that accompanies arrest when
questioned. Consequently, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
erred when it arbitrarily analogized imprisonment to involuntary
commitment.
They also experience shock upon being questioned by authorities
because an involuntarily committed individual does not have the
same procedural protections as a prisoner.127 Prisoners and the
involuntarily committed both benefit from having a right to counsel
but prisoners benefit from this right prior to being confined.128
Prisoners are not so confined without being read their Miranda rights,
being informed of the wrong they committed, and being afforded the
right to be tried by their peers or pleading guilty. These protections
ensure that the rights of prisoners are not infringed upon without
adequate process. Further, the Fifth Amendment protection against
double jeopardy ensures that prisoners are confined for a set period
of time and for only one length of time for each crime.129

126.
127.
128.
129.

Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012).
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See id. amend. V.

97 N.C. L. REV. 1014 (2019)

1034

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

Additionally, prisoners are generally confined for breaking the law in
the past, not for potential harms they may cause in the future.
In contrast, involuntarily committed individuals do not reap the
benefit of a formal criminal process like incarcerated individuals.130
As a result, involuntarily committed individuals often have no reason
to be aware of their constitutional privilege to be free from compelled
self-incrimination solely by way of the commitment process.131
Whereas prisoners have been read their Miranda rights and had
access to representation during trial, involuntarily committed
individuals may be detained without being read their rights132 or
attending the hearing.133 In addition, involuntary commitment is
indefinite, unlike the sentencing requirements for prisoners.
Moreover, the involuntarily committed are confined because of
actions they may commit in the future, not crimes they have
committed in the past. These differences expose the flaw in the
Supreme Court of North Carolina’s reasoning in Hammonds because
the court sidestepped these basic procedural differences when it
rejected custody per se for the involuntarily committed.
Involuntarily committed individuals, by law, are incapable of
caring for themselves. They should not be charged with ensuring that
their Fifth Amendment privilege is protected without being informed
of their right to counsel for crimes that may have been committed
beyond the actions that facilitated commitment. It follows that
because individuals who cannot care for themselves also should not
be charged with being aware of and protecting their rights, they
would be shocked by police questioning in the hospital setting for this
reason. Consequently, the transportation to a hospital and subsequent
commitment would represent a sharp and ominous change because it
cuts a person off from their normal life and companions in an
unexpected manner that an individual is not informed of as it is
happening.
Further, the involuntarily committed are more like the civilian
who is whisked to the station house in Miranda than the prisoner who
130. See State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 623, 777 S.E.2d 359, 372–73 (2015)
(Inman, J., dissenting) (“Unlike prison and jail inmates, who necessarily have been
advised of their Miranda rights in the course of their prior arrests, and who often have had
the benefit of counsel in the course of their criminal cases, involuntarily committed
patients may have had no prior occasion to be so advised or even to think about their
rights if approached by police.”), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804 S.E.2d 438 (2017).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 25–26.
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is questioned by authorities while in prison, as in Fields.134
Admittedly, the confinement in a hospital, on its face, may not seem
to be an inherently coercive environment like an interrogation room.
Some may argue that an involuntarily committed individual may not
seem to be in a coercive, police-dominated environment just by being
committed, since hospitals are not places where police questioning
normally occurs.135 But being involuntarily committed is not like being
a civilian in a hospital, because there is a legal restraint on leaving and
moving about the hospital.136 In Hammonds’s case, he could not leave
to use the restroom without supervision and had a designated “sitter”
outside of his room at all times. While an individual may not
understand they are in custody at the outset, the realization would
almost certainly set in the moment an involuntarily committed
individual had to use the restroom or attempted to leave the hospital.
After all, under North Carolina law, “reasonable force” can be used
to restrain individuals if they attempt to leave the twenty-four-hour
facility137—a practice that sharply differs from the average civilian’s
ability to refuse treatment and leave the hospital.138 Therefore, when
police question an involuntarily committed individual, the hospital
room transforms into the sort of interrogation setting Miranda was
designed to protect against—a place where an individual is “deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.”139
The essence of the shock problem lies in the swiftness by which
the setting can change into a coercive environment. As law
enforcement begins to question a person whose autonomy is
restricted, that individual’s situation represents the “sharp and
ominous change” which “may give rise to coercive pressures” for the
person being questioned.140 If an involuntarily committed individual
were to try to leave, they would be unable to do so.141 And because
the involuntary commitment process does not guarantee that
134. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 502 (2012).
135. See Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. at 623, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting)
(“In the hospital cases cited by the majority, the defendant was in a medical facility on his
own volition, not legally restrained in any way.”).
136. See id. (stating that the “circumstances of an involuntarily committed person are
not the same as those of a typical hospital patient” because while both are in a medical
facility, involuntarily committed individuals are legally restrained).
137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-251(e) (2017).
138. The ability to refuse treatment is implied by the doctrine of informed consent. See,
e.g., id. § 90-21.13.
139. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
140. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012).
141. See id.
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individuals will understand the terms of their confinement,
involuntarily committed individuals would likely believe that they are
being held for the same reason they are being questioned by police.
At the onset of the interrogation, the individual’s setting more closely
resembles the station house in Miranda than a prison cell. Thus, shock
would set in. Where prisoners would have reason to know that they
could not leave the prison and thus would not feel coerced in that
environment, the exact opposite is true for involuntarily committed
individuals. Where civilians would actually be able to leave, the
involuntarily committed are prohibited from doing so. It follows that
the involuntarily committed are at the mercy of the interrogating
officers and, therefore, require a bright-line custody per se standard.
C.

A Bright-Line Test Is the Correct Solution

A bright-line test for custody determinations is not a novel
concept.142 The test functions by finding custody per se when a certain
condition is met143 and allows for the presumption to be rebutted by
law enforcement by showing that an exception applies.144 In addition,
the custody per se designation would not disqualify an inquiry into
whether there was an interrogation or whether the defendant
supplied a “voluntar[y], knowing and intelligent[]” waiver of their
right to counsel.145 Such tests have been proposed to protect
prisoners146 and those who are subject to “particular coercive actions
taken by law enforcement that are commonly associated with formal
arrest,” otherwise known as “arrest-like restraints.”147 Although
suggested, neither imprisonment nor an arrest-like-restraints method
for extending custody per se has passed muster before the Supreme
Court of the United States.148

142. See generally Then, supra note 13, at 845, 862–66 (proposing a bright-line test for
custody based on arrest-like restraints imposed on defendants by law enforcement).
143. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 504 (explaining the Sixth Circuit’s ruling that “isolation
from the general prison population combined with questioning about conduct occurring
outside the prison makes any such interrogation custodial per se”); Then, supra note 13, at
863 (“[A]ny individual subjected to arrest-like restraints—such as being placed in
handcuffs or into the back of a police car, or having weapons drawn on him—is in custody
for purposes of Miranda.”).
144. Then, supra note 13, at 863.
145. See id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
146. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 504.
147. Then, supra note 13, at 844, 866.
148. See, e.g., Fields, 565 U.S. at 507–08.

97 N.C. L. REV. 1014 (2019)

2019]

PRESUMING CUSTODY

1037

A bright-line custody per se standard should be adopted for the
involuntarily committed to preserve their Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination.149 Since rigidity is a core
function of Miranda, other proposals for custody per se rules, such as
the presence of arrest-like restraints, do not align as well with current
jurisprudence. For instance, neither the Fields nor the Hammonds
decision turned on whether the individual was restrained.150 In fact,
both decisions were decided differently, despite neither defendant
being restrained during interrogation. Yet an arrest-like restraints
rule has been proposed as a means of finding custody for purposes of
Miranda. With respect to individuals who are involuntarily
committed, there is a stronger argument for a custody per se rule than
an arrest-like-restraints rule because individuals’ civil commitment
status is unambiguous.151 Civil commitment is based on a judicial
order for someone to enter twenty-four-hour care against their will.152
Therefore, the line would be drawn at whether the individual has
attained the “legal status denoting the court-ordered treatment.”153
Arrest-like restraints, on the other hand, are far less cut-and-dry and
could range from the defendant being placed in handcuffs to having a
weapon drawn on them.154 A civil commitment order would provide a
simpler determination than other proposals for custody with little to
no need for interpretation by the courts.
D. Custody Per Se Does Not Manifest the Fears of Miranda
Dissenters
Likewise, a custody per se rule for the involuntarily committed
would not greatly affect the current tests, as some have feared.155
Imposing a bright-line custody per se standard for the involuntarily
committed would not be applicable to a large population. Despite
mental illness affecting millions of Americans, only a small fraction
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
150. See Fields, 565 U.S. at 515; State v. Hammonds, 370 N.C. 158, 163, 804 S.E.2d 440,
442 (2017).
151. See Then, supra note 13, at 866.
152. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
153. Id.
154. See Then, supra note 13, at 863.
155. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S 261, 283 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(warning that changes to the totality-of-the-circumstances test may force the Court “to
effect a fundamental transformation of the Miranda custody test—from a clear, easily
applied prophylactic rule into a highly fact-intensive standard resembling the voluntariness
test that the Miranda Court found to be unsatisfactory”).
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are civilly committed.156 Further, no other group is both similarly
restricted in freedom of movement and as susceptible to influence as
are the involuntarily committed. The combination of the two
characteristics makes the involuntarily committed a unique group in
need of a bright-line rule presuming custody. Accordingly, other
groups seeking application of this designation would likely fall short
because they would not be able to show similar government-imposed
confinement and a class-wide susceptibility to influence. Regardless,
if another class were able to show the same type of vulnerability that
the involuntarily committed experience, a custody per se designation
should not be foreclosed on that group altogether.
Those who oppose altering the totality-of-the-circumstances test
or who oppose Miranda rights altogether may shudder at the idea of
creating a custody per se rule for any group.157 However, the fear is
unfounded because the custody per se rule would allow the totalityof-the-circumstances test to remain intact for all other groups not
similarly restrained. Thus, while J.D.B. offers a legal basis for
proposing a change to the standard, the elevated vulnerability of the
civilly committed allows the custody per se rule to keep from further
muddying the waters by altering the custody standard for only one
group.
Additionally, the interests in general societal security, “swift and
sure apprehension” as a means of deterrence, and rehabilitation
espoused by Justice White in his dissent in Miranda are either served
or unaffected by this rule.158 Unlike those who are “whisked” from
their homes159 and questioned at a police station, the involuntarily
committed will still be confined to the facility even if they do not
156. While North Carolina does not compile data on the number of civil commitments
in the state, other states do. See generally AA ALLEN & JK BONNIE, UNIV. OF VA. INST.
OF LAW, PSYCHIATRY & PUB. POLICY, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: ADULT CIVIL
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS IN VIRGINIA FYI 2015 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/589a1500893fc0cdfe2b5fc5/t/58a3606fd1758eb85565da95/1487102064073/AnnualReport_F
Y15_Adults.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4LF-F9XW]; CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH CARE SERVS.,
CALIFORNIA INVOLUNTARY DETENTIONS DATA REPORT: FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2015–
2016 (2017), https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/MH/Documents/FMORB/FY15-16_Involuntary_
Detentions_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2FV-DLKK]; Annette McGaha, Paul G. Stiles &
John Petrila, Emergency Involuntary Psychiatric Examinations in Florida, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVS., Sept. 2002, at 1171.
157. See J.D.B., 564 U.S at 281–82 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing an alteration to the
totality-of-the-circumstances” test as “fundamentally inconsistent” with providing a “clear
rule”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)
(stating that there is no precedent for the procedural safeguards offered by Miranda).
158. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539–41 (White, J., dissenting).
159. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 499 (2012).
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cooperate with authorities.160 Thus, they will not be free to harm
another by refusing to answer questions for the authorities.
Moreover, deterrence is unaffected because the custody per se rule
would only apply to individuals who are already confined and,
therefore, already “apprehended” to a degree.161 Finally,
rehabilitation is not affected because the very nature of involuntary
commitment is to receive “treatment . . . for mental health or
substance abuse.”162 So while judges who differ in their approaches to
implementing Miranda have been reluctant to allow for a custody per
se rule,163 it is time to create a new standard to protect this vulnerable
group.
CONCLUSION
One of the core foundations of Miranda is that it “places a high
value on clarity and certainty.”164 However, the need for clarity and
certainty cannot be achieved at the expense of a right that is
“fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege.”165 For
those who are involuntarily committed, the current test is applied too
broadly and does not offer precautions to guard them from coercion.
Since Miranda and its progeny have hardly budged in considering
“whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning
being given,”166 a bright-line test presuming custody preserves the
objectivity of Miranda and protects the interests of the involuntarily
committed. By analogizing involuntarily committed individuals to
prisoners simply because both are “restrained,” the Hammonds court
erred in unilaterally denying a custody per se rule for the
involuntarily committed. And since involuntarily committed
individuals are “susceptible to influence” but unable to benefit from a
modified totality-of-the-circumstances test, they need this

160. By law, an individual committed on an inpatient basis for mental illness cannot be
released until “the criteria for inpatient commitment are no longer met.” TURNAGE ET
AL., supra note 48, at 52.
161. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 539–41 (White, J., dissenting).
162. TURNAGE ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
163. Compare State v. Hammonds, 243 N.C. App. 602, 609, 777 S.E.2d 359, 365 (2015)
(rejecting a custody per se rule for the involuntarily committed), rev’d, 370 N.C. 158, 804
S.E.2d 438 (2017), with id. at 622, 777 S.E.2d at 372 (Inman, J., dissenting) (“I agree with
the majority that the nature of involuntary commitment does not render police
questioning custodial per se . . . .”).
164. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 282 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
165. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
166. Id. at 468.
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presumption to protect their constitutional privilege to be free from
compelled self-incrimination. In sum, a bright-line test for custody for
the involuntarily committed preserves the rights protected by
Miranda without disrupting the legal landscape Miranda is built upon.
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